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A TA L E O F TW O M A Y O R S : C O U R T S A N D
P O L I T I C S I N I R A N A N D TU R K E Y
Countries such as Iran and Turkey do not fit comfortably into the democratic and au-
thoritarian categories. In these countries, elections are held regularly, and the will of the
people is accepted as one source of sovereignty. At the same time, both constitutionally
and in practice the elected officials have to share the exercise of political power with
institutions that do not draw their power directly from the will of the people. In such
systems, the judiciary has two important political functions. First, the judiciary acts as
a politically insulated decision-maker through which the unelected head can exercise
some degree of control over the actions of the elected head. Second, the judiciary’s
direct involvement in the political arena increases political tensions and legitimates the
continuation of the two-headed system. In systems based on divided sovereignty, the
tensions created by the judicialization of politics contribute to the stability of the regime.
Two caveats, however, are in order. First, a double-headed executive system is not a
necessary condition for the judicialization of politics. Judicialization of politics is also
common in a number of countries with single-headed executive systems, such as the
United States. However, as the discussion here suggests, the conditions for judicializa-
tion of politics are particularly ripe in countries with divided sovereignty. Second, the
political systems in Turkey and Iran are not exactly the same. Having begun its first
democratic experience in 1945, and despite three formal military interventions (1960,
1971, and 1980), Turkey is an old democracy among developing countries. Despite this
long experience with democracy and democratic institutions, however, Turkish democ-
racy remains unconsolidated. Iran’s experience with democratic institutions is much
shorter in duration. Although since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1907 Iran
has periodically experimented with free elections and multi-party politics (1907–21 and
1941–53), these experiments have generally been short-lived. The victory of Mohammad
Khatami in the presidential elections of 1997 and 2001 has once again opened the po-
litical system. Iran’s overall political system nevertheless continues to display strong
authoritarian tendencies. In short, Turkey is an unconsolidated democracy, while Iran
is an unconsolidated authoritarian regime. Despite the differences, however, the Iranian
and Turkish political systems have enough similarities to warrant a comparison. As
I will show, these similarities include a commitment to constitutionalism, division
of sovereignty between elected and unelected institutions, and the prominence of the
judiciary in the political arena.
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The first two sections of the article develop the theoretical framework of the study.
I will then look at the constitutional structures of Iran and Turkey and discuss the role
assigned to the judiciary in the two systems. The final section examines the politically
important court cases of Recep Tayyip Erdogˇan, a former mayor of Istanbul (1994–98),
and his Iranian counterpart Gholamhussein Karbaschi, a former mayor of Teheran (1990–
98). However, at the outset I should point out that my interest is not in establishing the
guilt or innocence of the individuals involved. Rather, I hope that the analysis provided
here will shed some light on the role of the judiciary in the politics of countries with
two-headed executives.
J U D I C I A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S A N D R E G I M E S TA B I L I T Y
Some observers view the active role of the courts in the political arena, particularly in
developing countries, as a manifestation of the politicization of the judiciary. Such a
view implies that the courts are dependent on political actors. Judicialization of politics,
however, assumes that the judiciary enjoys some level of independence vis-a`-vis other
political actors. Whereas politicization of the judiciary points to the influence of political
actors in the judicial arena, judicialization of politics refers to the expansion of the
judiciary’s political role. Although the expansion of the political role of the judiciary is
a global reality, its consequences are not clear. In a democracy, of course, the judiciary
plays an important role in both maintaining the rule of law and safeguarding the rights of
the citizens. As Larry Diamond notes, “[E]lected executives, state bureaucrats, soldiers,
and police cannot be held accountable without a judicial system that has the constitutional
and political autonomy to ensure a genuine rule of law.”1 The judiciary not only serves
as an obstacle to the tyranny of the majority; it also serves as an important restraint on
the activities of the other branches of the state and provides an additional mechanism of
accountability.
These goals are often achieved through “judicial review,” the power of the courts
to rule on the legality of the actions of the other branches of government. Despite the
general recognition that some form of judicial review is desirable, if not necessary,
for the functioning of democratic regimes, the practice remains controversial. First,
of course, the power of an unelected and politically insulated judiciary to review the
actions of popularly elected branches of government is in tension with the ideal of
popular sovereignty, which is at the heart of democracy. Second, critics warn that the
judiciary’s active involvement in policy-making undermines the democratic process.
When the regime-supporting coalition loses its cohesion, political actors will try to
remove controversial issues from the political agenda by referring them to the courts or
other so-called neutral institutions. While the objective is to decrease political tensions,
such practices can lead to further polarization and can accelerate the breakdown of the
regime.2 As Juan Linz notes, “The legitimacy of having judicial bodies make what are
essentially political decisions in a democracy is always doubtful, and in countries where
judicial bodies have been established only recently, their judgment is even less likely to
be considered binding.”3
The authority of “neutral” institutions in making binding political decisions is further
undermined by the loss of impartiality. Although institutions such as the judiciary might
remain structurally independent, their active participation in the decision-making process
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undermines their ability to act as impartial arbiters.4 Over-reliance on the courts can fan
political tensions and further undermine the cohesiveness of the polity.
The effects of judicialization of politics on non-democratic regimes are less clear.
In general, we tend to associate an independent judiciary with democracy.5 However,
authoritarian regimes, too, might be willing to work with an independent judiciary.
First, a strong and independent judiciary can be an effective instrument of ensuring that
lower-ranking officials implement decisions made at the top.6 Second, there might be a
general convergence of views between the members of the judiciary and the authoritarian
leadership.7 Furthermore, an authoritarian regime, unlike a democratic one, which at
least in theory has to abide by the rule of law, might not feel obligated to implement
the decisions of a disagreeable judiciary. Finally, an independent judiciary can provide
the authoritarian regime with some level of legitimacy.8 Nevertheless, the available data,
although limited, suggests that the breakdown of authoritarian regimes follows a pattern
similar to that of democratic regimes as far as the role of the judiciary is concerned.9
In short, in both democratic and non-democratic regimes, over-judicialization of poli-
tics indicates and contributes to tensions that can undermine the stability of the system and
lead to the breakdown of the regime. As tensions increase, those who lose in the electoral
and legislative processes might appeal to the courts for a more favorable outcome. At
the same time, political leaders might prefer to refer highly contentious political issues
to the courts, or to court-like institutions, to prevent an open split among the ruling elite.
Relying on the judicial process to resolve divisive political issues not only is unlikely
to reduce tensions, but it has the potential of creating new ones. The legislative process,
particularly in democracies, is based on bargaining and compromise. It creates neither
absolute winners nor absolute losers. The judicial process, however, is based on find-
ing “Truth” and establishing guilt. The judicial process creates absolute “winners” and
“losers.” As Stephen Krasner notes, “[J]udicial procedures are designed to judge the guilt
or innocence of individuals, but developing stable democratic societies. . . requires[s]
prudent political calculations, not judicial findings.”10 Reliance on the judicial process
to resolve political issues undermines support for the regime and can pose a threat to the
consolidation of democracy.
D I V I D E D S OV E R E I G N T Y
Many modern regimes are hybrids of electoral democracy and authoritarianism.11 In hy-
brid regimes, an elected executive and unelected institutions jointly exercise sovereignty.
In many cases, the military forces constitute the unelected executive, but as the Iranian
example shows, this need not be the case. Although the military, because of its access
to the means of violence and its hierarchical structure, is obviously more capable of
performing the role of an unelected partner in the exercise of power, some civilian
institutions, such as a well-entrenched religious establishment, might also be capable of
fulfilling this function.
Political systems based on divided sovereignty are distinguished from authoritarian
and democratic regimes by two characteristics. First, unlike in purely democratic or
purely authoritarian systems, the two heads jointly exercise power. While it is true that the
unelected head limits the powers of the elected head, the latter’s powers are not residual.
Elections are held regularly; governments change as a result of these elections; and the
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elected governments, both in theory and in practice, render considerable power. Elections
in such countries are not mere window-dressing, as is often the case in authoritarian
systems. Nor are the elected governments mere puppets. The unelected head, despite its
privileged position, cannot ignore the results of elections or the powers of the elected
head. Although the unelected head might be able to influence policy on a large number
of issues, it cannot ensure the outcome of the policy-making processes. In other words,
unlike in authoritarian systems, there is a high level of uncertainty, and the unelected
head cannot get its way all the time.12 At the same time, however, the elected executive
has to share power with an unelected executive.
Second, systems of divided sovereignty, or what Daniel Brumberg calls “dissonant in-
stitutionalization,” by definition embody a high level of tension. The adoption of a system
based on divided sovereignty itself indicates a division in the ruling coalition concerning
the nature of sovereignty. As Brumberg notes, “[D]issonant institutionalization occurs
when competing images of political community and the symbolic systems legitimating
them are reproduced in the formal and informal institutions of state and society.”13
This institutionalization of competing ideologies means that the political structure will
continue to generate tensions and encourages conflict within the polity. These tensions,
however, are not necessarily destabilizing and are needed for the survival of the overall
system. If the tensions between the two heads of the system are resolved in favor of ei-
ther one of them, the system will experience an out-of-type transformation. It will either
become fully democratic or fully authoritarian. A regime based on divided sovereignty
must prevent social and political tensions from boiling over and threatening the stability
of the system while generating enough tension to justify the continued presence of both
heads of the executive.
These regimes use a number of tactics to achieve this mix. One common tactic is
to try to remove potentially controversial issues from the political agenda by relying
on detailed constitutions and legal codes. A second useful tactic is the referral of po-
tentially controversial issues to formally sanctioned, but “non-political,” autonomous
policy-making bodies.14 Both tactics tend to encourage a more active political role for
the judiciary. Heavy reliance on detailed constitutions and legal codes automatically
expands the powers of the judicial bodies that have to interpret and implement the laws.
Furthermore, a politically “insulated” judiciary can be an effective restraint on the powers
of the elected head. Hence, it is not surprising that out-going authoritarian regimes often
try to pack the judiciary with their supporters as a means of guaranteeing their privileges
after the transition.15
Another important function of the courts in systems based on divided sovereignty is
the control and creation of tensions that are necessary in legitimating the regime. A state
based on divided sovereignty lacks a hegemonic ideology and “can become vulnerable to
efforts by competing social forces to radically redefine its ideological foundations.”16 As
the examples of Turkey and Iran show, the appearance of these social forces encourages
the state—or, at least, those parts opposing change—to turn to the courts. Taking poten-
tially divisive political issues to court might prevent an open confrontation between the
two heads. However, as this article suggests, the population at large might not find the
courts’ politically significant decisions binding. The instability created by this disregard
for legal decisions in turn tends to justify the unelected head’s threat perception and to
justify the continuation of its guardian role. Thus, what appears to be regime-threatening
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political instability becomes a mechanism for preserving the division of sovereignty
between elected and unelected institutions.
T H E C O N S T I T U T I O NA L S T RU C T U R E O F I R A N A N D T U R K E Y
Shortly after the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, a clergy-dominated
assembly was elected to prepare a constitution suitable for the new regime.17 After
receiving Ayatollah Khomeini’s support, the draft constitution was submitted to a national
referendum on 2–3 December 1979. According to official figures, it received 15,680,339
positive votes against 78,516 negative votes.18 Support for the constitution was closely
linked to the personal popularity of Ayatollah Khomeini, who automatically assumed
the highest position in the system as the Supreme Leader.
As students of Iranian politics are well aware, the Islamic Republic simultaneously
displays totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic tendencies.19 The openness of Islam
to different interpretations and the pluralism of the politicized sections of the religious
elite has prevented the development of a full-fledged totalitarian system, and combined
with Iran’s constitutional tradition and the mass mobilization of the revolution, it has
encouraged competitive politics.20 Iranian voters have genuine, although limited, choices
in parliamentary and presidential elections, making Iran unique among non-democratic
countries. Furthermore, parliamentary debates are often passionate and challenge the
executive.21 At the same time, however, both the Parliament and the president are subject
to the limitations imposed by the Supreme Leader. As H. E. Chehabi notes, “[W]hile the
regime is somewhat responsive to the citizenry, it is not accountable to a demos.”22
According to the constitution, absolute sovereignty belongs to God. However, the
constitution also provides a role for the people in the exercise of sovereignty. It reads,
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He who has made man
master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to
the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine right
in the manner specified in the following articles. [Article 56]
Accordingly, the constitution creates the office of the Supreme Leader of the Revo-
lution. Article 5 of the constitutions stipulates that “During the Occultation of the Wali
al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah
devolve upon the just [↪adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the circum-
stances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will
assume the responsibilities of this office.” Article 57 charges the Supreme Leader with
the duty of supervising the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches. At the
same time, however, the constitution also endorses the principle of popular sovereignty
and representative government by creating a popularly elected legislature and presidency
(Articles 114 and 62, respectively).
Over the past twenty years, Iran has devised a number of mechanisms to deal with
tensions created by this dichotomy. During Khomeini’s tenure as the Supreme Leader,
his personal charisma was used to diffuse the tension, while institutions such as the
Guardian Council (shurayi negahban), half of whose members must be Islamic jurists
appointed by the Supreme Leader, reviewed all laws passed by the legislature to ensure
their conformity with Islamic principles. Another example is the Regime’s Expediency
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Council (majma‘i tashkhis-i maslahat-i nizam), which is charged with resolving conflicts
between the legislature and the Guardian Council. Finally, of course, it is the Supreme
Leader himself who is the ultimate arbiter of disputes among the various institutions of
the state.23
A similar dual executive system, although with important differences, is in operation
in Turkey under the 1982 constitution. The 12 September 1980 military coup took place
at a time that the Turkish political system appeared paralyzed and political violence had
become a daily problem. Hence, the coup and its leadership enjoyed a high level of
support among the population. From the beginning, the generals made it clear that they
did not intend to stay in power indefinitely and that they intended to return power to
elected civilian politicians in the near future. They also made it clear that the status quo
ante was unacceptable and that they intended to restructure Turkish politics. To prevent
the political polarization that was blamed for the problems of the 1970s, they introduced
a new constitution and put in place a number of new laws and regulations that could not
be amended by future governments.
After the coup, the five generals who had staged the coup reconstituted themselves as
the Council of National Security (CNS)24 and convened a special assembly to compose
a new constitution. Notably absent from the assembly were politicians, most of whom
had been banned after the coup. The assembly presented the draft of the new constitution
to the CNS, where it was further modified before being formally adopted in a national
referendum on 7 November 1982. Some 91.27 percent of the electorate took part in the
referendum and gave the constitution an overwhelming approval rating of 91 percent.25
A number of steps were taken to ensure a high approval rating in the constitutional
referendum. All eligible Turkish citizens were legally required to participate in the
referendum. Failure to do so would have disqualified them from participating in the next
parliamentary elections. Approval of the constitution was linked to support for the popular
leader of the coup, General Kenan Evren. General Evren personally took over the task
of officially explaining the draft constitution to the public. Furthermore, the approval of
the constitution meant that General Evren would automatically become the president of
the Republic for a seven-year term.26 Finally, like its Iranian counterpart, the Turkish
constitution was adopted under extraordinary conditions, and support for it represented
a desire for return to normalcy.27
The 1982 constitution established “a dual system of executive decision making.”28 The
exercise of political power is shared between the popularly elected civilian authorities
and the military. This duality is also well recognized by the general public, who make
a sharp distinction between the popularly elected civilian leadership constituting the
government (hu¨ku¨met) and the military-dominated state (devlet). While the constitution
establishes a parliamentary democracy based on popular sovereignty, it limits the exercise
of popular sovereignty by providing for the formal participation of unelected actors in
the decision-making process.
An important manifestation of this duality is the ambiguous position of civilian institu-
tions with regard to the armed forces. The most important constitutional instrument of the
armed forces’ involvement in the political arena is the National Security Council (Milli
Gu¨venlik Kurulu). The National Security Council (NSC) first received formal recognition
in the military-inspired 1961 constitution that was put in place after the 1960 military
coup. From the beginning, the NSC was envisioned as a forum for joint policy-making
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by military and civilian officials. A series of constitutional amendments adopted after
the military intervention of 1971 curbed some of the freedoms guaranteed by the con-
stitution and augmented the powers of the NSC. The 1980 military intervention led to
further strengthening of the military’s role in the decision-making process. Article 118
of the 1982 constitution enumerates the membership and the duties of the NSC:
[t]he National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General
Staff, the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders
of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the
chairmanship of the President of the Republic.
Depending on the particulars of the agenda, Ministers and other persons concerned may be
invited to meetings of the Council and their views be heard.
The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking
decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and
implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give
priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures
that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the
integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society [emphasis added].
The new constitution specified who the civilian members of the NSC were and ensured
the numerical equality of the civilian and military members. The Parliament could no
longer increase the number of civilians on the council through ordinary legislation.29
The constitution instructs the cabinet to give “priority consideration to the decisions of
the National Security Council.”30 Under this system, the NSC no longer makes “recom-
mendations”; instead, it makes “decisions.” The NSC has a permanent secretariat, thus
making it a permanent actor in the decision-making process. While the “decisions” of the
NSC are theoretically only advisory, and the final decision for their implementation is left
to the council of ministers and Parliament, it is clear that the framers of the constitution
conceived of the NSC as an important actor in the decision-making process.31 As one
observer has noted, “[Under the 1982 constitution], far from returning to the barracks,
the military retained considerable influence over governmental policy making through
its majority representation in the National Security Council.”32
The NSC enjoys wide-ranging discretion in setting the agenda for its monthly meet-
ings. Through the mechanism provided by the NSC, the military leadership has par-
ticipated in making policies that range from lifting the parliamentary immunity of the
members of the (pro–Kurdish) Democratic Party to offering Arabic in secondary schools,
and from stand-by agreements with the International Monetary Fund to bank failures.33
The wide range of topics covered by the NSC has meant that there has been a high
level of tension between the military and the civilian leadership, irrespective of the
political ideology of the government in power. However, this does not mean that the
Turkish military has been able to “get its way” in every decision. Nor does it mean
that the military is involved in every decision made. In contrast to the decisions of the
Iranian Supreme Leader, the decisions of the NSC are only “advisory,” and their final
implementation is left to the civilian politicians in the cabinet and Parliament. In many
instances, the civilian leaders, ever mindful of their popularity, have resisted the wishes
of the military.34 This resistance, however, is often used by the military as a sign of the
“irresponsibility” of the civilian politicians who are willing to support the decisions of
the NSC on paper but then fail to implement them.35
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In sum, Iran and Turkey have two-headed political systems in which executive power
is jointly exercised by popularly elected officials and by institutions drawing their le-
gitimacy from sources other than popular sovereignty. While in the Turkish case the
exercise of sovereignty by the elected officials is subject to the approval of the military-
dominated NSC, in the Iranian case it is the Supreme Leader who limits the power
of the elected president.36 The extent to which the unelected head actively participates
in the decision-making process varies across issue areas and time. The potential for
the unelected partner’s involvement in the decision-making process, however, is always
present. The result is that a high level of tension is inherent in the political system of
both countries.
One consequence of the division of sovereignty is a tendency toward the de-
politicization of political issues by trying to remove controversial issues from the political
arena. The length of the Iranian and Turkish constitutions (177 articles each) and the
details into which they go in discussing political, social, and economic issues is to a
large extent a reflection of the desire of the framers of these constitutions to remove
a number of issues from the political arena. This distrust for politics is also reflected
in constitutionally sanctioned non-political specialized agencies, councils, and boards
that are found in the two countries. In the Iranian case, the constitution sanctions both
a Guardian Council, consisting of six Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader
and six jurists selected by Parliament from a list proposed by the head of the judiciary,
himself appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the Regime’s Expediency Council, whose
members are appointed by the Leader (Articles 91 and 112, respectively). While the first
is charged with the duty of reviewing legislation to ensure its conformity to Islamic
principles and the constitution, the second is given the task of resolving differences
between Parliament and the Guardian Council (Articles 4 and 112, respectively).
Reliance on non-political councils is even more pronounced in the Turkish case, where
there are constitutionally sanctioned specialized councils or boards to arbitrate strikes
(Article 54), supervise elections (Article 89), and administer institutions of higher edu-
cation (Articles 130–32). There is also a separate body to supervise radio and television
broadcasts. What is significant about these boards and councils is that the elected political
branches have little control over their membership. The members of the Higher Edu-
cation Council (Yu¨kseko¨gˇretim Kurulu), which supervises all matters related to higher
education, for example, are appointed by the president of the Republic, a non-partisan
office holder, from among candidates nominated by the Council of Ministers, the Chief
of the General Staff of the military, and the universities (Article 131).37
Finally, the desire to rely on neutral institutions to resolve essentially political issues
is also reflected in the structure and functions of the judiciary. As I discuss in the next
section, in both Iran and Turkey the judiciary is assigned a wide range of political roles,
which it performs in isolation from the political head of the executive branch. At the
same time, however, the judiciary is expected to perform these functions in accordance
with the views of the unelected head.
D I V I D E D S OV E R E I G N T Y A N D T H E J U D I C I A RY
The structural independence of the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed in both Turkey
and Iran. However, independence in both cases means only political insularity of the
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judiciary from the popularly elected executive. The views of the unelected head are
made known not only through public announcements and frequent “briefings” given to
the various groups, including members of the judiciary, but also through a socialization
and selection process that—at least, at the higher levels of the judiciary—reproduces the
desired ideology and values among the courts’ personnel.
This is most clear in the Iranian case, where, according to Article 157 of the constitu-
tion, the head of the judiciary is appointed by the leader of the Revolution without any
formal input from the elected president or Parliament. According to Article 156 of the
constitution, “the Judiciary is an independent power.” The constitution further addresses
the structural independence of the judiciary in Article 164:
[a] judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the post he occupies
except by trial and proof of his guilt, or in consequence of a violation entailing his dismissal. A
judge cannot be transferred or redesignated without his consent, except in cases when the interest
of society necessitates it, that too, with the decision of the head of the judiciary branch after
consultation with the chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General.
At the same time, however, the judiciary is expected to follow a certain ideological line.
The preamble of the constitution defines the role of the judiciary in following terms:
[t]he judiciary is of vital importance in the context of safeguarding the rights of the people in
accordance with the line followed by the Islamic movement, and the prevention of deviations
within the Islamic nation. Provision has therefore been made for the creation of a judicial system
based on Islamic justice and operated by just judges with meticulous knowledge of the Islamic
laws. This system, because of its essentially sensitive nature and the need for full ideological
conformity, must be free from every kind of unhealthy relation and connection.
Thus, independence from political influences is seen as a guarantee that the judiciary
will enforce the correct ideological line. While judicial independence is valued, the
constitution sees the judiciary as the enforcer of the ideological line defined in practice
by the Supreme Leader. To achieve this mixture, the judicial branch and the security forces
are cut off from the legislature and the elected executive. The fact that the judiciary has
an official head and his direct appointment by the leader of the Revolution suggest that
the judicial branch is viewed as an equal, or perhaps even superior, partner of the elected
executive and legislative branches. The superiority of the judiciary is also alluded to by
the head of the judiciary’s role in the appointment of the minister of justice, a member
of the president’s cabinet. According to Article 160 of the constitution, the minister of
justice is chosen from among candidates nominated by the head of the judiciary.
Although the judicial branch in Iran does not have the power of judicial review,
a power that is specifically reserved for the Guardian Council, it is constitutionally
assigned certain duties in supervising the activities of the elected head of the executive
branch. The head of the judiciary supervises the proper implementation of the laws and
along with the president and speaker of Parliament supervises the state-controlled radio
and television (Articles 156 and 175, respectively). He is to draft judicial laws fitting for
the Islamic Republic (Article 158), and he reviews the accumulation of wealth by high-
ranking members of the executive branch. The head of the judiciary is also a member of
Iran’s NSC, and in the case of the Supreme Leader’s untimely death or incapacitation will
serve on the Leadership Council (Articles 142 and 111, respectively). The judiciary is also
formally represented on the council for the Revision of the Constitution (Article 177).
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Hence, the constitution formally assigns a number of political functions to the judiciary
while attaching it to the unelected head of the political system.
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the Turkish case. Article 138 of the 1982 con-
stitution guarantees the independence of the judges by prohibiting outside interference
in the adjudication of disputes and forbids the National Assembly from discussing the
cases before the courts. The constitution also guarantees security of tenure for judges
and public prosecutors and provides them with a high degree of internal autonomy in
personnel matters through the constitutionally sanctioned Supreme Council of Judges
and Public Prosecutors (Article 159).38
The length to which framers of the Turkish constitution were willing to go to insulate
the judiciary against pressure from politicians is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the
appointment process to the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi). The court not
only has the power of judicial review; it also has a number of other political functions,
including the power to try high-ranking officials and to supervise political parties. These
principles were first introduced in the 1961 constitution, in which a Constitutional Court
modeled after the German Constitutional Court was created.39 In the German case, the
two houses of Parliament appoint the sixteen members of the Federal Constitutional
Court. Furthermore, while six of them are drawn from the judges serving on the federal
bench, the political parties nominate the other ten. The German constitutional court
stands out as a “political court.”40
In contrast, political branches do not have a direct role in determining the composition
of the Constitutional Court in Turkey. Seven of the eleven members and three of the
four substitute members of the court are appointed by the president of the Republic
from among candidates nominated by the High Court of Appeals (Yargıtay), the Council
of State (Danıs¸tay), the Military Court of Appeals (Askeri Yargıtay), the High Military
Administrative Court (Askeri Yu¨ksek ˆIdare Mahkemesi), and the Court of Accounts
(Sayıs¸tay). The president also appoints one member from among academic personnel of
the universities nominated by the Higher Education Council and three members and one
substitute from among high civil servants and lawyers (Article 146). In short, professional
judges and senior civil servants dominate the Turkish Constitutional Court. Influence of
political parties is also limited by the fact that the presidency under the 1982 constitution
is a non-partisan office and the fact that the constitution does not foresee any role for the
prime minister and the cabinet, or Parliament, to influence appointments to the court.
Despite its non-political composition, the court has political functions. In addition
to the judicial review of legislation, the Constitutional Court is also the venue for the
trial of the president of the Republic, members of the council of ministers, members of
Parliament, members of the Constitutional Court itself and the other high courts, public
prosecutors, and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecu-
tors (Article 148). The court is also responsible for overseeing political parties and for
dissolving those political parties found in violation of the Constitution or the Political
Parties Law (Article 69), a function that it has exercised with zeal, closing seventeen
political parties since 1983.41 As Yekta Gu¨ngo¨r ¨Ozden, at the time the president of the
Constitutional Court, noted, “[T]he functions of the court are of a political character.”42
Similarly, Mehmet Turhan, a rapporteur at the Constitutional Court, notes, “[T]he ju-
diciary [is] given a considerable power in the exercise of sovereignty,” with the aim of
“put[ting] an end to the principle of the supremacy of the Parliament.”43
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The judiciary’s political functions are also exercised through special courts, partic-
ularly the State Security Courts (Devlet Gu¨venlik Mahkemeleri). State Security Courts
(SSCs) were first organized in the 1970s but were shut down by the Constitutional Court
for violating the constitutional guarantee of trial before a constitutionally designated
judge. They were resurrected under Article 143 of the 1982 constitution “to deal with
offences against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free
democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Cons-
titution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the State.”
These courts are presided over by a three-judge panel. Until June 1999, when the cons-
titution was amended, one of the judges was an active-duty military officer serving on
the military courts.44 The vagueness of the term “internal and external security of the
state” means that SSCs deal with a wide range of issues, including terrorism, freedom
of expression, organized crime, bank failures, and corruption.
Like its Iranian counterpart, the Turkish judiciary sees itself as the defender of the
regime in power. The chief justice of Turkey’s Constitutional Court opened the 1993
session by noting that “the Constitutional Court was the guardian of the regime” and
that “the state that does not protect itself is not a state.”45 This sentiment is also shared
by Turkey’s current minister of justice, who in February 2001 referred to the Court
of Cassation Chief Prosecutor’s Office as the “guardian of the regime.”46 The Turkish
judiciary sees itself as the defender of such concepts as republicanism, secularism, the
indivisible integrity of the state, and democracy. These concepts are enumerated in the
constitution, but their meaning is, of course, subject to interpretation. Although few
judiciaries can match the Iranian record of the past few years, the Turkish judiciary’s
presence in the political arena is a constant feature of Turkish political life.
In both Iran and Turkey, provisions are in place to insulate the judiciary from political
pressure from elected officials. In neither country, however, is the judiciary an “impartial”
actor when it comes to matters concerning the state. As it is discussed in the next section,
in recent years both Iran and Turkey have witnessed a growing split between the views
of the two heads of the executive. One manifestation of this split has been the expansion
of the judiciary’s political role. In both countries, the unelected head has relied on the
judiciary to target popular politicians and political movements.
T H E J U D I C I A RY I N AC T I O N
Iran’s political system was put to the test by the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the
presidential election of May 1997. In a relatively free election by Iranian standards,
Khatami won a landslide majority against the candidate publicly endorsed by Ayatollah
Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. He won by attracting the support
of the younger generation through a campaign promising more personal and cultural
freedoms. Khatami’s victory was interpreted as a rejection of the Supreme Leader and
his control of the political system. In the words of the French diplomat and journalist
Eric Rouleau, “[T]he cohabitation between the faqih Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme
politico-religious authority, and President Mohammad Khatami has come to resemble
a multi-faceted guerrilla war.”47 President Khatami has seen his proposals defeated by
the so-called conservatives supported by the Supreme Leader who controlled Parliament
until the parliamentary elections of February 2000, while the judiciary has shut down
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pro–Khatami newspapers48 and increased its scrutiny of Khatami’s political allies, in-
cluding trying and imprisoning Gholamhussein Karbaschi, the former mayor of Tehran.
Born in 1955 to a clerical family, Gholamhussein Karbaschi belongs to a younger gen-
eration of politicians. Before the revolution he had studied mathematics at the university
while also taking part in classes at religious seminaries. After Khomeini’s triumphant
return to Iran in January 1979, Karbaschi worked on Khomeini’s personal staff and
attracted the ayatollah’s attention. His career took off in 1982, when at age twenty-seven
Ayatollah Khomeini appointed him the governor of Isfahan, one of Iran’s most important
provinces. The years in Isfahan gained Karbaschi a reputation as someone who could
get things done. He was widely praised for his work, particularly for restoring the city of
Isfahan’s historic beauty and charm. In 1990, he was appointed as the mayor of Teheran
by President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
Karbaschi’s popularity continued to increase as mayor, although his policies also
generated considerable controversy. Under his leadership, public services were improved
and new roads and parks were built. The roots of Karbaschi’s popularity, however, are
much deeper than these material improvements suggest. As Fariba Adelkhah notes,
“Karbaschi has been at the point where spirituality (ma’ad) and material things (ma’ash)
converge. . . . [H]e has in practice been opening up a space for all sorts of practices
which. . . involve reshaping the private and public spheres.”49
On 17 January 1996, only three months before the parliamentary elections, Karbaschi
and fifteen other technocrats associated with the reform policies of President Hashemi-
Rafsanjani formed Kargozaran-i Sazandigi (Executives of Construction) and entered the
campaign in support of the “reformist” candidates. The group showed its true political po-
tential in the May 1997 presidential elections when it supported the victorious campaign
of Mohammad Khatami. Karbaschi mobilized the resources of the Tehran municipality
in support of the campaigns of Khatami and other reformist candidates.50 Particularly
important was the municipality’s popular daily Hamshahri, which, “through its support
for Khatami, probably brought out more voters than any campaigning could have done.”51
Ideologically, Karbaschi and other members of the Executives of Construction belong to
what Farhang Rajaee has described as “Islamic yuppies.” They want to modernize Iran
without Westernizing it. They might be political liberalizers within the Iranian context,
but, like other liberalizers, they have no intention of overthrowing the existing system.52
In July 1997, shortly after the presidential elections, in response to a call from the
Supreme Leader to intensify the fight against corruption, offices of the Tehran municipal-
ity were raided and a number of high-ranking officials were taken into custody. Karbaschi
himself was arrested in April 1998.53 His arrest was met with wide-scale public demon-
strations and was interpreted as another assault by the conservatives on the reform policies
of President Khatami. The public’s reaction forced Ayatollah Khamenei to ask the heads
of the three branches (Ayatollah Yazdi, representing the judiciary; the speaker of Parlia-
ment and defeated presidential candidate Nateq-Nouri; and President Khatami), along
with the chairman of the Expediency Council (former President Hashemi-Rafsanjani), to
find a solution to the crisis. They recommended that Karbaschi be released from prison
while awaiting trial for corruption and embezzlement.54 Karbaschi’s trial began on 6
June 1998 and concluded with a guilty verdict on 23 July 1998.55
In his court defense, Karbaschi admitted that mistakes might have been made and
that high-ranking municipal officials had been given special privileges. However, he
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justified these privileges by arguing that it was for the good of the country, that such
practices were common in all government institutions, and that without such practices the
administration would not be able to attract qualified personnel.56 At the end, however, he
was found guilty of embezzlement and misuse of government funds. The court sentenced
him to five years in jail and sixty lashes (suspended). He was also ordered to return 1.6
billion rials to the municipality and to pay a fine of 1 billion rials. Most important, he
was barred from holding any public office for a period of twenty years. On appeal, the
jail term was reduced to two years, and he was barred from politics for ten years. The
lashes were converted into a monetary fine.
Despite the conviction, public support for Karbaschi has been strong. The trial was
televised nationwide, and millions of Iranians remained glued to their TV sets for the
duration of the trial. The verdict against the mayor was met with public demonstra-
tions and letters and editorials in the media in support of the mayor.57 Most interesting,
however, reformist political figures, including President Khatami, continued to support
Karbaschi. In a phone conversation with Karbaschi’s wife the day after his imprison-
ment, the president expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the trial and his
regrets “that the country is deprived of [Karbaschi’s] services for the time being.”58 The
conservatives reacted to the continued support for Karbaschi and the attempts to free
him from prison by pointing to the contradiction between talking about the rule of law
and civil society, two favorite themes of President Khatami, and asking for clemency
for a convict. The Tehran Times, for example, chastised both President Khatami and
Hashemi-Rafsanjani for expressing “regret” over Karbaschi’s conviction,59 while Resalat
wrote,
The most important gain of the trial of Mr. Karbaschi was not the conviction of a violator or a
member of the rival political group but the revelation of the faces of the “factionalists” who claim
to be “law abiding.” . . . The factionalists claiming to be law abiding once again have auctioned off
all their past claims and are now building trenches against the law. Apparently, in the civil society
claimed by these gentlemen, “law” is the first and last word. But will anything remain of civil
society by pursuing this method?”60
Under pressure from both the public and the reformers, Ayatollah Khamenei pardoned
Karbaschi on 25 January 2000.61 Continued support for Karbaschi is particularly inter-
esting not only in that it is coming from sources high within the regime but also in that
he was convicted of embezzlement and mismanagement of public funds. This outcome
suggests that the Iranian public has rejected the moral authority of the courts in making
judgments and dispensing punishment. The Iranian courts share this problem with their
Turkish counterparts.
Turkey’s dual-executive system was first challenged in the 1983 parliamentary elec-
tions, when in a three-party race the Motherland Party led by the late Turgut ¨Ozal
emerged victorious, even though the military had declared its preference for another
party. Although ¨Ozal was not the military’s candidate, the military did not find him
objectionable as prime minister. First, ¨Ozal was well known to the military and had
served as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs under the military regime.
Second, ¨Ozal and his Motherland Party did not openly challenge the privileged position
of the NSC; nor did they try to amend the constitution radically.62 Finally, any potential
reservations that the military might have had were mitigated by the fact that ¨Ozal had to
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serve under General Evren as president. By 1989, when ¨Ozal himself was elected to the
presidency, he was clearly acceptable to the state.
A more severe shock was the victory of the Refah (Welfare) Party in the parliamentary
elections of December 1995. An Islamist party, Refah was led by the veteran politician
Necmettin Erbakan. Although it won only 21 percent of the national vote, it emerged as
the single largest party in Parliament. After months of maneuvering by the “secularist”
parties and the military to prevent Refah from coming to power, Erbakan formed a
coalition government with former Prime Minister Tansu C¸iller’s True Path Party. Having
failed to prevent Refah from coming to power, the state turned to the judiciary. Under
pressure from the military, the coalition government resigned in June 1997.63 Refah was
put on trial before the Constitutional Court for attempting to undermine Turkey’s secular
system and was closed on 16 January 1998. The closure of the Refah Party did not end
the struggle against political Islam. An important part of this struggle has been attempts
to undermine the local network of Refah and its successor, the Fazilet (Virtue) Party.64
In this regard, one of the most important steps was the trial and imprisonment of Recep
Tayyip Erdogˇan, the former mayor of Istanbul.65
Born in 1954, Erdogˇan began his political career in the youth branch of Refah’s pre-
1980 coup predecessor, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamat Partisi).66 After the
formation of Refah in 1984, he joined that party and become the head of its Istanbul
branch. In 1994, Erdogˇan was elected mayor of the greater Istanbul municipality.
Erdogˇan’s tenure as mayor was controversial. Under his leadership, as even critics
agree, there was a marked improvement in municipal services. While some of these
improvements were due to policies that were initiated before Erdogˇan took office, it
is generally agreed that he played a positive role. However, charges of corruption and
mismanagement accompanied Erdogˇan’s successes, although all agree that neither cor-
ruption nor mismanagement is limited to Istanbul or the Islamists and that corruption is a
problem in all Turkish public institutions irrespective of the political party or individual
politician in charge. In general, it is also agreed that Erdogˇan has not personally benefited
from corruption.67
The legal case against Erdogˇan was initiated because of a speech he had delivered
on 6 December 1997 at a Refah-organized meeting in the city of Siirt, in southeastern
Turkey, where Kurds form a significant part of the population.68 The location and timing
of the speech made the Turkish authorities particularly sensitive to its content. The local
prosecutor found the two lines of poetry with which Erdogˇan had begun his speech
objectionable. Taken from a poem by the famous Turkish poet and one of the intellectual
fathers of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Go¨kalp (1876–1924), the lines in question are part
of a fictional dialogue between the Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes (r. 1068–71) and the
Selcuk Sultan Alparslan. In the first part of the poem, the Byzantine emperor declares,
“I will burn the Koran, I will burn the Kaba; Those coming from the East will not see
domes with minarets.” In his speech, Erdogˇan did not refer to the threat made by the
emperor, but he went on to recite the sultan’s response: “minarets are bayonets, domes
helmets; mosques are our barracks, and the believers are soldiers.” The rest of the speech
was a typical political speech, in which Erdogˇan pointed to his achievements as the
mayor and the unfairness of criticisms directed against him, and mildly complained
about Turkey’s strict secularism and the restrictions put on public displays of religious
sentiments.
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On 9 December 1997, the local prosecutor of the Republic filed charges against
Erdogˇan in Diyarbakir’s State Security Court. The prosecution argued that the context in
which the poem was used constituted a threat to the secular state and its institutions and
was prosecutable under Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code, which prohibits “inciting
people to hatred based on religion or race.” In court, Erdogˇan argued not only that the
words were not aimed at inciting people to hatred, but that the poem belonged to one
of Turkey’s most important political thinkers and literary figures. He also noted that
neither Go¨kalp nor the poem in question was banned, and that the poem was included
in textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education. Erdogˇan’s defense team also found
the lawsuit in violation of the Turkish constitution and the rulings of the European Court
of Human Rights.
Nevertheless, in April 1998 the court found Erdogˇan guilty as charged and sentenced
him to ten months’ imprisonment (under the current regulations he served four months)
and payment of a fine. He was also banned from politics for life. The decision was upheld
on appeal, and Erdogˇan entered prison on 27 March 1999.69 He was released from prison
in July 1999.
Erdogˇan’s conviction and subsequent incarceration were met with negative reactions
from both his domestic supporters and the international community. The court verdict
was met with large rallies in his support. There were also supportive demonstrations
when he reported to prison to begin serving his sentence. He remained popular while
in prison and was visited by a large number of supporters and political figures on a
daily basis. Erdogˇan’s conviction also received a negative reaction from the international
community. Even Turkey’s staunch ally, the United States, issued a statement voicing its
displeasure with the verdict and, in a public show of support for Erdogˇan, dispatched its
counsel-general in Istanbul, Caroline Hagins, to meet the embattled mayor the day after
the verdict was confirmed by the Court of Appeals. After the meeting, Hagins noted that
“such developments will weaken confidence in the Turkish democracy.”70 The verdict
was also criticized by the European Union, various human-rights organizations, and the
more liberal segments of the Turkish society, who, although not necessarily sympathetic
to Erdogˇan’s political views, found the verdict incompatible with the basic principles of
freedom of speech and democracy.
Despite the differences in charges against them and the fact that Erdogˇan was elected
whereas Karbaschi was appointed to his post, the two cases have a number of similarities.
First, of course, is the fact that in both trials the accused was the mayor of the most impor-
tant metropolitan center in his country. Karbaschi and Erdogˇan used the resources of the
municipality to build an extensive patronage network, which is potentially useful in both
local and national politics. In the Turkish case, the economic liberalization of the 1980s
was accompanied by attempts at administrative decentralization.71 As a consequence,
by the end of the 1980s both the decision-making powers of the municipalities and their
financial resources had been augmented, leaving the mayors in control of important
redistributive and organizational mechanisms. A political party’s control of a major
municipality can put it in a privileged position in national politics by giving it access to a
political machine capable of providing special services to its constituents. The Istanbul
municipality, for example, not only is a major employer but has invested in a variety
of economic enterprises. According to the former mayor, it also provides financial aid
to 27,500 students.72 Refah-controlled municipalities, like municipalities controlled by
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other Turkish parties, have also been known to provide groceries, heating fuel, clothing,
and so on to the poorer segments of society free of charge or at highly subsidized
prices. Such practices, of course, not only provide services for the poor, they can also
provide economic opportunities for the not so poor, and are important mechanisms for
maintaining patron–client networks.
Similarly, under Karbaschi the Tehran municipality engaged in a variety of activities
such as publishing; investing in various economic ventures, including some in other
cities; providing direct or indirect support for political candidates; and so on. At one
point, the Tehran municipality even made a grant to Columbia University in New York
for the translation of the works of the Muslim historian Tabari.73 The municipality also
“encouraged” businessmen to contribute to the campaigns of reformist candidates. When
asked about this practice by the judge, Karbaschi replied that his aim was to “warm up”
the campaign.74
Second, it is generally agreed that both Erdogˇan and Karbaschi were relatively suc-
cessful in improving municipal services. The success of the Refah Party in Turkey’s 1995
national elections was due to the superior performance of the Refah mayors, particularly
the mayors of large metropolitan centers of Istanbul and Ankara. As Jenny White has
noted, “[I]n municipalities controlled by Refah buses run, the garbage is collected, and
social services in general have improved.”75
Praise has also been strong for Karbaschi. For much of the past ten years he has
been a poster boy for the Islamic Revolution and was portrayed as a capable manager
transforming Tehran from a barely livable city to a modern metropolis.76 The English-
language daily Tehran Times, which in general has not been friendly to Karbaschi, for
example, noted in an editorial published shortly after the start of the trial that “there is
no doubt that Karbaschi who has been suspended to act as mayor during the trial period
has several feathers in his cap. No doubt he and his teammates have transformed the face
of the sprawling capital of the Islamic Republic. No one can deny the fact that changes
which have taken place for the better in Teheran’s geographical and architectural features
are praiseworthy.”77
Third, at the time of their trials, both Erdogˇan and Karbaschi were regarded as rising
political stars with national appeal. Both his supporters and his detractors saw Erdogˇan
as one of the most dynamic leaders within the Islamic movement and as a potential
replacement for the aging Necmettin Erbakan. Similarly, Iranian commentators saw
Karbaschi as an increasingly important figure in Iranian politics.
Fourth, the reaction to these cases points to the failure of the legitimating functions
of the Iranian and the Turkish judicial systems. Although both Erdogˇan and Karbaschi
were convicted in courts of law and served time in jail, and despite the political ban
imposed on them, they have remained viable as political actors. Karbaschi continued to
serve as the secretary-general of the Executives of Construction while in prison.78 A few
days after his release he resumed his political activities by publishing a new newspaper,
Hammihan, the first issue of which appeared shortly before the parliamentary elections
of February 2000.79 He was also given permission to establish a bank.
Similarly, the ban imposed on Erdogˇan has not ended his political life. In 2001,
Erdogˇan led the reformist wing of the closed Virtue Party to form the Justice and De-
velopment Party, becoming one of its founding members and secretary-general. The
Turkish Constitutional Court, however, ruled that as a banned politician Erdogˇan could
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not be a founding member of a political party. The party removed Erdogˇan’s name from
the list of its founders but kept him as secretary-general. Parliament changed the law to
lift the political ban on politicians such as Erdogˇan. Accordingly, Erdogˇan was retried
and reconvicted. The Supreme Election Board, composed of justices from the Court of
Cassation and the Council of State, rejected Erdogˇan’s candidacy in the November 2002
elections because of the conviction. Nevertheless, the Justice and Development Party
won a landslide victory and came to power with an absolute parliamentary majority.
Unable to form a government himself, Erdogˇan formed a caretaker government under
his deputy, Abdullah Gu¨l. The new Parliament moved quickly to amend the constitution
to allow Erdogˇan to take part in future elections. The Justice and Development Party
also challenged the result of elections in the Kurdish-populated city of Siirt, where
Erdogˇan had recited the offending poem. The Elections Board accepted the challenge
and scheduled new elections for 9 March 2003, allowing Erdogˇan to stand as a candi-
date. His victory was certified on 11 March 2003, and he was allowed to take his seat in
Parliament immediately. Within an hour, Prime Minister Gu¨l handed in his resignation,
and President Sezer promptly asked Erdogˇan to form a new government.
Finally, the two cases discussed here and other similar cases are a manifestation of the
loss of cohesion in the two polities. Erdogˇan’s trial was part of a larger crackdown on
the Islamist movement in general. Similarly, as the Iranian journalist Morteza Mardiha
points out, “[Karbaschi’s trial] in reality was the trial of the modernizations of Hashemi80
and the modernity of Khatami, . . . Karbaschi was arrested, humiliated, and convicted so
that Hashemi and Khatami would learn a lesson and discover the sensitivities of their
common rival.”81 Karbaschi and Erdogˇan are not anti-systemic politicians.82 In fact, they
are products of the very system that convicted them. They were convicted not because
of what they had done as individuals but because of the rising popularity of the political
movements that they represented. They became targets of judicial proceedings only after
elections produced results that were unacceptable to the guardians of the Turkish and
Iranian regimes.
C O N C L U S I O N
Students of democratization and public law often see the extensive involvement of the
judiciary in the political arena as undesirable. They recognize that some level of judicial-
ization of politics is necessary for the functioning of the modern state and for the creation
of democratic accountability, yet they warn that over-judicialization of politics can be a
destabilizing factor. They warn that reliance on the courts in settling controversial polit-
ical disputes undermines the regime’s cohesion by discouraging political compromises
that are part of the political process. These arguments, however, generally draw their
conclusions based on cases of purely authoritarian or democratic regimes. In view of the
evidence presented in this article, it is necessary to modify some of these arguments.
Iran and Turkey represent political structures that combine authoritarian and demo-
cratic practices and institutions. In these countries, sovereignty is divided between elected
executives and unelected ones who act as guardians of the regime. High levels of tension
and conflict are inherent in such systems. Divided sovereignty is based on a system
of “contending authorities” in which the democratic elements of the system encourage
change while its non-democratic features try to limit the ideological and social aspects
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of that change.83 The resulting social conflict encourages the involvement of the courts.
This judicialization of politics, however, is not necessarily destabilizing. In fact, judicial-
ization is an integral part of the mechanism used by the guardians to maintain the overall
division of sovereignty. The courts are empowered to decide controversial political issues
to limit the influence of the popularly elected institutions and to preserve the privileges
of the guardians.
Relying on the judiciary to limit the influence of elected officials and to remove those
who are unacceptable has several advantages. First, in countries such as Iran and Turkey,
courts are formally designed to serve as checks on the powers of elected officials, while
they have little or no control over the guardians. Both the Turkish military and the Iranian
Supreme Leader are exempt from the jurisdiction of civilian courts. Some have even gone
as far as to suggest that the Supreme Leader is “infallible.” Second, the courts are likely
to be sympathetic to the views of the guardians. In Iran, the Supreme Leader has direct
control over the judiciary and can guarantee a favorable outcome through the judicial
process. Even in Turkey, where the military has no direct control over the judiciary, the
military is likely to find the courts more sympathetic than elected political institutions
such as legislatures and city councils. Unlike legislative bodies, courts are not directly
accountable to voters, and at least in theory, they are not influenced by public opinion.
Furthermore, the “merit-based” promotion and selection process used in Turkey produces
a judicial system that, at least at its upper levels, where most politically sensitive cases
are likely to end up, is sympathetic to the views of the guardians.84
Third, the guardians hope that by turning to the courts they can enhance the legitimacy
of their actions while creating a dilemma for the elected executive. The rule of law, even
undemocratic law, is at the heart of democracy. Hence, the guardian’s attempt to enforce
the law is presented as legitimate and democratic, while the elected head’s resistance
becomes illegitimate and undemocratic. Fourth, turning to courts is an attempt to bring
“finality” to the discussion without a direct confrontation between the guardians and the
elected executive. As a former president of the Turkish Constitutional Court noted, one
purpose of going to court is to “put a stop to complaints [and] debates, . . . and to put an
end to controversies.”85
These two last functions, however, are dependent on the public’s perception of the
impartiality of courts as arbiters and the “justness” of their decisions. Although courts are
not expected to consider public sentiments in making decisions, their power lies in the
acceptance of their decisions by the people. This is particularly important in politically
sensitive cases where the real battle is for the hearts and minds of the public. As the Iranian
commentator Akbar Ganji, himself a victim of the crackdown on reformers, notes,“ [I]n
political crimes the court decision is not binding, if it is not accepted as binding by the
people.”86 It is here that the failure of the Iranian and Turkish judiciaries is most evident.
The public reaction to the convictions of Karbaschi and Erdogˇan, and to similar judicial
decisions, suggests that the judiciary’s active involvement in political controversies has
eroded its image as a neutral arbiter among the public. Karbaschi and Erdogˇan are not
unique. A similar disregard for the courts’ decisions can be seen in the closure of political
parties and politically disagreeable publications. Turkey’s two leading Islamist political
parties, the Justice and Development Party and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), are
successors to the banned Fazilet Party. Fazilet itself had replaced the banned Refah
Party (closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998), which itself had replaced the banned
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National Salvation Party (closed after the 1980 military coup), which had replaced the
National Order Party (closed by the Constitutional Court in 1971).87 Similarly, banned
Iranian publications have reappeared under different names with seemingly no damage
to their reputation. When the press court closed the daily Jame’eh, it reappeared as Tus.
When Tus was shut down, Neshat replaced it. Neshat’s closure was followed by the
publication of ‘Asr-e Azadegan as the new reformist newspaper.
Surprisingly, however, the failure of the courts to produce popularly acceptable deci-
sions contributes to the continued division of sovereignty between elected and unelected
institutions. Linz, Arturo Valenzuela, and others are correct in pointing out that judi-
cialization of politics points to the breakdown of cohesion in the ruling bloc and that it
fans political and social tensions. In countries where elected and unelected executives
have to cohabit, however, a high level of tension is needed for the survival of the system.
The disregard shown for judicial decisions tends to justify the continued vigilance of
the unelected head. Relations between the two heads of the executive in such systems
are perhaps best described by Turkey’s former President Su¨leyman Demirel, who, when
asked in 1998 for his thoughts on a looming crisis between Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz
and the military high command, replied,
In an English zoo there was an experiment to have wolves and lambs live together in one cage.
Someone asked the director if the experiment was working. The director replied, yes, but sometimes
we have to replace the lambs.88
Without a high level of tension to keep the sides at a safe distance from each other,
the cohabitation of the wolf and the lamb is not likely. In political systems based on
divided sovereignty, the tensions created by the reliance on “neutral” forces to address
essentially political issues are necessary for the maintenance of the regime.
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